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1. Introduction 
Avoiding a 2ºC increase in global temperature is one of the main goals in the fight against 
climate change. A key factor for success is cutting carbon dioxide emissions. (Bows‐
Larkin, Mander, Traut, Anderson, & Wood, 2010) Aviation contributes to a relatively 
large degree to these emissions, being responsible for about 12% of global transportation-
related carbon dioxide emissions with only 3% of the global fossil fuel consumption. 
(Simone, Stettler, & Barrett, 2013).  
Climate change awareness has been accompanied by increased environmental legislation 
(Kumar, Ugirashebuja, Carnwath, Tamminen, & Boyd, 2019). Among the most discussed 
pieces of legislation in Sweden was the aviation tax implemented in April 2018. The tax 
is applied to all airline passengers departing Swedish airports with some exceptions. 
Another Nordic country, Norway, implemented an aviation tax in June 2016. Both taxes 
are designed to make air transport bear a larger part of the costs caused by air transport 
emissions. (Andersson & Falck, 2017) In this thesis I study the impact of these two taxes 
on airline passenger volume using a difference-in-differences method with fixed effects. 
As a note, Norway adjusted their tax in April 2019 to closer match the aviation tax in 
Sweden. However, this tax will not be included in the analysis as it is too recent. 
1.1 Research objective & hypotheses 
The objective of this thesis is to study if the aviation taxes in Sweden and Norway have 
impacted passenger numbers. I am using a dynamic difference-in-differences method with 
fixed effects and airport-level data in line with what Falk and Hagsten (2019) established. 
My contribution is applying robust statistical methods in analysing the impact of these 
aviation taxes in the Nordic countries. I am not studying the elasticity of demand or supply. 
This thesis’ methods differ slightly from Falk and Hagsten (2019): The analysis is 
completed with monthly seasonally adjusted data, instead of yearly data. I also utilize 
conventional fixed effects regressions, instead of Falk and Hagsten’s choice of a fixed 
effects quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QML‐FE). 
The Nordic countries are more isolated than Central Europe so the potential for 
isolating the effect of the aviation tax could be greater, as travelling to a neighbouring 
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country to fly from there is harder. This thesis can provide relevant insight to decision-
makers in the Nordic countries on the impact of the aviation taxes. The statistical methods 
in use theoretically allow drawing causal links specifically for the Nordic countries. This 
is especially useful for Finnish decision-makers as a citizens’ initiative calling for an 
aviation tax has reached the required number of signatures to reach the Finnish parliament 
(Jääskeläinen & Kilpinen, 2019). This thesis is therefore a small contribution to the 
economics papers helping fight climate change.  
 
Based on previous research I have formed the following hypotheses: 
1. The aviation taxes in Sweden and Norway have reduced passenger numbers at a 
significant level only at airports dominated by low-cost airlines.  
2. The aviation taxes in Sweden and Norway have not reduced passenger numbers 
at a significant level when accounting for all airports. 
These hypotheses would be partially in accordance with the findings of Falk and Hagsten 
(2019) studying Germany and Austria. However, my hypothesis predicts the taxes will 
not have a significant effect, with the exception of airports dominated by low-cost airlines. 
Fichert, Forsyth and Niemer (2014) claim that the low-cost segment of air travel is more 
sensitive to price increases due to a lower number of business travellers and a higher 
increase in percentage terms. 
 
The third hypothesis is the null hypothesis: 
3. The aviation taxes in Sweden and Norway have not had a significant impact on 
passenger numbers regardless of airport characteristics. 
This would be in line with the findings of Seetaram, Song and Page in the United 
Kingdom. (Seetaram, Song, & Page, 2014)  
 
1.2 Overview of passenger air transport in Norway and Sweden 2010-
2019 
Norway implemented a flat rate aviation tax on all departing passengers in June 2016. In 
2018 Sweden implemented a similar tax. In an effort to make the tax reflect airline 
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emissions, they designed the tax to have three rates roughly dependant on flight distance. 
One year later Norway copied the design of the Swedish aviation tax, although only 
utilising two different amounts. In tables 1.1 and 1.2 the timelines of the aviation taxes in 
Norway and Sweden are displayed. 
 
Table 1.1 Norwegian aviation tax rates 2010-2019, departing passengers.  
 All departures Destination country 
in Europe 
Destination country 
outside Europe 
– 5/2016 - - - 
6/2016 – 12/2016 80 NOK - - 
2017 82 NOK - - 
2018 83 NOK - - 
1/2019 – 3/2019 84 NOK - - 
4/2019 – 12/2019 - 75 NOK 200 NOK 
 
Table 1.2 Swedish aviation tax rates 2010-2019, departing passengers. 
 Annex 1: Destination 
country in Europe  
Annex 2: Select 
destinations close to 
Europe 
Other countries 
– 3/2018 - - - 
4/2018 – 12/2018 60 SEK 250 SEK 400 SEK 
2019 61 SEK 255 SEK 416 SEK 
 
1.3 Arguments behind aviation taxes 
There are several arguments for implementing a specific tax on air travel, as air travel 
generally has an advantageous position from a tax standpoint. For example, air travel is 
generally exempt from VAT. In some countries such as Germany there is VAT on 
domestic air travel, however, this is not the case in all countries.  Another benefit for the 
aviation sector is the fact that air fuel, kerosene, is exempt from tax globally. (Fichert et 
al., 2014) One could make the argument that air travel has unfair tax advantages. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Negative externalities 
An aviation tax is essentially a tax on a negative externality. A negative externality is a 
cost imposed on a third party not included in the original transaction. There are two types 
of negative externalities: Consumption externalities, such as the negative impact of 
passive smoking. Production externalities, such as the pollution of a chemical factory in a 
river. A negative externality can cause a loss in efficiency in the economy. If companies 
do not consider the negative externalities of their production, the economy will suffer.  
An example of a negative production externality causing economic loss is the 
chemical factory mentioned earlier. In fig. 1 the production decision of the company can 
be seen. In this model we assume pollution is strictly tied to production levels. The 
company is maximising their profit by producing where the marginal cost MC equals the 
marginal revenue (price P in this case) the level q1. However, as the company produces 
more it also pollutes more, the marginal external cost MEC. In this model MEC directly 
translates to environmental damage. From the viewpoint of society, the company is 
overproducing, and the optimal level is q* where the marginal social cost MSC equals 
marginal revenue. The marginal social cost is the marginal cost and the marginal external 
cost added together. (Pindyck et al., 2009)  
 In fig. 2 the example of a polluting company is extended to the whole chemical 
industry. Where: MC = the supply curve of the chemical industry, MEC = aggregate 
marginal environmental cost, MSC = marginal social cost of all companies in the chemical 
industry. Here we can see that the price P1 is not optimal due to not accounting for the 
marginal social cost. Fig. 2 displays in the area highlighted in yellow the cost of the 
negative externality. Moving from the production level that maximises profit, Q1, to the 
one maximising marginal social cost reduces chemical company profits and consumers of 
chemicals have to pay higher prices. This is offset by the fact that the environment was 
harmed less leaving society better off by the amount in the highlighted triangle in Fig. 2. 
(Pindyck et al., 2009)  
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Figure 1 Simple model of a chemical company production decision. MSC = marginal 
social cost, MC = marginal cost, MEC = marginal external cost, P1 = price of steel. (self-
drawn graph, based on Pindyck et al., 2009)  
 
 
Figure 2 Simplified model for the chemical market assuming a negative externality 
(pollution) and assuming all companies behave as illustrated in Fig.1. (self-drawn graph, 
based on Pindyck et al., 2009)  
 
Air traffic pollution is a textbook example of a negative externality. In countries with no 
aviation tax or cap and trade system, airlines bear hardly any of the cost for the pollution 
they cause. The fuel used by airplanes, kerosene, is globally exempt from tax. This is also 
the case with flights in the European Union. (Council Directive, 2003/96/EC) However, 
 Emil Warras  
6 
 
the European Economic Area does have a cap and trade system in place for aviation 
emissions.  
2.1.1 Tax theory on negative externalities 
There are several methods governments can utilise in fighting negative externalities. I will 
present the two most prominent alternatives, one type already in use in certain countries 
in Europe and one in the whole European Economic Area: 
In his book The Economics of Welfare (1920) A. Pigou presents way to combat 
negative externalities. Now known as a Pigouvian tax, the tax targets negative externalities 
through taxing the market activity leading to the externalities. The goal of a tax is to adjust 
a sub-optimal market outcome. The size of the Pigouvian tax is adjusted to be equal to the 
social cost of the negative externalities. (Pigou, 1920) Aviation taxes, which are a type of 
carbon tax, are an example of Pigouvian taxes. The challenge in implementing a Pigouvian 
tax is calculating the social cost of the pollution. 
Another method of controlling negative externalities, specifically pollution, is a so 
called “Cap and Trade” emissions trading system. There are several systems of this kind 
in place, but they all operate on the same basic principle; a cap is set on the maximum 
amount of emissions allowed during a time period. Subsequently rights to pollute are 
allocated or auctioned off to the market participants in the industries under the respective 
emissions trading schemes. (Council directive, 2003/87/EC)  
The current system in place in the EU, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein is known as 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, and since 2012 aviation emissions are 
also included. This means that the aviation sector in the countries of interest for this study 
is already part of a cap and trade system. The original plan was for the system to apply to 
all flights to and from the European Economic Area. However, the scheme only includes 
flights inside the EEA, because of resistance from the United States and China. (EU 
Regulation 2017/2392)  
 The general consensus among economists is that a carbon tax is the best alternative 
in the fight against climate change. United States economists believe in the tax so strongly 
that a joint statement of over 3500 economists, including 27 Nobel Laureate Economists, 
 Emil Warras  
7 
 
was published in the Wall Street Journal advocating for carbon taxes. (Climate Leadership 
Council, 2019)  
2.1.2 Goals of a tax on a negative externality 
Reducing the harmful effects of the negative externality is commonly the main goal of a 
negative externality. This is common for taxes such as the alcohol tax in many countries, 
meant to reduce consumption. A secondary goal of a Pigouvian tax is revenue for the state. 
Depending on the elasticity of the tax both goals of the tax can be achieved. If the product 
being taxed is inelastic, the harmful effects of the tax will not be reduced. This appears to 
be the case for the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden. However, if the product being 
taxed is elastic, taxing it would reduce the harmful effects of the externality. One could 
say that the goal of a negative externality tax is to destroy its tax base. 
2.2 Elasticity and Deadweight loss 
2.2.1 Elasticity  
Elasticity measures how a change in one variable proportionally changes another. For 
example, how a change in the price of air travel impacts passenger numbers. This will be 
discussed in the following chapter. In equation (1) the formula for the x-elasticity of y can 
be seen.  
𝜀 =  
𝜕𝑦/𝑦
𝜕𝑥/𝑥
     (1) 
Rewriting this into a formula for the price elasticity of a quantity demanded or supplied 
yields (2): 
𝜀 =  
𝜕𝑄/𝑄
𝜕𝑃/𝑃
     (2) 
An elasticity of ε > 1 means the price elasticity is elastic, ε < 1 means it is inelastic, 
whereas ε = 1 is neutral or unit elastic. 
 
Brons, Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld (2002) completed a meta-analysis of 37 studies on the 
price elasticity of air travel. They claim the price elasticity of air travel is directly related 
to the number of substitutes available, such as alternative modes of transport. Other factors 
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such as geography, the country’s wealth and population can affect the elasticity as well. 
Brons et al. also note that for leisure travel, different routes may be substitutes for each 
other, i.e. Mallorca and Cyprus for a Mediterranean vacation. The result of the meta-
analysis was a mean price elasticity of -1.146 and the estimate had a standard deviation of 
0.619 (Brons et al., 2002). This would indicate that an increase in price would result in a 
proportionally larger decrease in demand. Gallet and Doucouliagos (2014) completed a 
similar meta-analysis and estimated the price elasticity of air travel to be -1.186. However, 
they emphasised the unique circumstances of different air travel routes would cause this 
estimate to vary greatly.  
In a more recent study, Sainz-González, Núnez-Sánchez and Coto-Millán (2011) 
studied the impact of airport fees on airfares for the leisure market in Spain. They found 
the price elasticity of demand to be between -1.4 and -0.98, which they claim is consistent 
with Gillen, Morrison & Stewart (2003) (as cited in Sainz-González et al., 2011).  
In 1976, Jung and Fujii studied the price elasticity of demand of air travel in select 
cities in the United States, focusing on the difference of long-haul and short-haul routes. 
Their findings put the median elasticity of demand at -2.737, with a 95 percent confidence 
interval of -1.776 to -3.150. However, the study only looked at routes under 500 miles 
(804 km) so no conclusions can be drawn for longer routes. Fichert et al. (2014) claim the 
elasticity of air travel varies between 0.3, for long-haul business travel to 1.5 for short-
haul private travel.  
2.2.2 Tax incidence 
Tax incidence indicates whether the consumer or producer bears the economic cost of a 
tax (not to be confused with statutory incidence, who legally pays the tax). The elasticity 
of demand and supply determine the tax incidence. In a situation with perfectly inelastic 
demand the consumer bears the entire cost of the tax. With perfectly elastic demand the 
producer bears the entire cost of the tax. Concerning supply, if it is perfectly inelastic, the 
producer bears the entire cost of the tax. If it is perfectly elastic, the consumer bears the 
entire cost of the tax. (Kotlikoff & Summers, 1987) (Fullerton & Metcalf, 2002)  
 Studying the tax incidence of passenger air transport, the burden of the tax or fees 
appears to be placed completely on the consumer; Sainz-González et al. (2011) studied 
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the impact of airport fees on airfares and tax incidence for the leisure market in Spain. 
They found that airlines transfer all airport fees (taxes) onto the passengers. 
Huang and Kanafani (2010) estimated airport tax incidence in the United States 
between 1993-1995. The results for nonstop flights were in line with Sainz-González et 
al. (2011), the entire tax burden is shifted onto the consumer. For nonstop flights, the price 
increase for the consumers was actually higher than the tax, a so called overshift. 
However, for connecting flights the airlines seemed to bear the full cost of the tax. This 
can be due to the design of the specific tax punishing connecting flights. 
2.2.3 Deadweight loss 
Deadweight loss comes from the loss of economic efficiency when there is not a free 
market equilibrium for a particular market. This is illustrated in figure 3. Should the 
government implement a tax on a free market the economic efficiency lost is the wedge-
shaped area between Q1 and Q2 in fig. 3. This area is known as a tax wedge and describes 
the deadweight loss from a tax. Specifically, it is the difference between the equilibrium 
price and quantity and the price and quantity arising in a taxed market. Different taxes 
impact the size of deadweight loss in different ways. (Krugman, Wells, & Graddy, 2007)  
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Figure 3 Deadweight loss of a market with a tax in place. 
 
When implementing a tax or other control scheme, such as cap and trade, for addressing 
negative externalities, it is inevitable that there will be deadweight loss. However, the lost 
economic efficiency is not the only factor at play: Theoretically the tax could reduce the 
quantity of product traded, e.g. airline tickets, which in turn would result in less pollution. 
With pollution being a negative externality, this would fulfil the goal of a Pigouvian tax. 
However, if demand is inelastic the Pigouvian tax may not impact the amount of airline 
passengers. An example of this can be seen in figure 4. (Krugman et al., 2007)  
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Figure 4 Deadweight loss on inelastic market with a tax in place. 
 
2.3 Substitutes for air travel 
When conducting an analysis on how a tax affects a mode of transport it is important to 
control for substitutes. For short to medium distances, the substitutes for air travel are 
trains, ferries, buses and cars. For countries with greater access to alternative modes of 
transport the effect of an aviation tax on passenger numbers can be greater, as there is 
more competition. However, for longer distances air travel is often the only realistic 
option. 
Sainz-González et al. (2011) found that air travel on the Spanish mainland, in 
comparison to air travel to islands, was more competitive. They speculate this is because 
of a lack of substitutes to air travel for the island routes.  
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3. Previous research 
3.1 Air traffic pollution and climate change 
The pollution from air traffic contributes disproportionately to climate change, in relation 
to other sources of pollution. Combating climate change has, trough many international 
agreements, become part of the agenda of many governments around the world. For many 
countries, part of this agenda is reducing passenger air travel. 
3.2  Research on the impact of aviation taxes on passenger numbers  
There are previous papers on the effect of aviation taxes on air transport passenger 
numbers. The results from many of them have been conflicting. Areas that are relatively 
isolated geographically appear to have more inelastic demand of air transport. Mayor and 
Tol (2007) studied the impact of the aviation tax in the United Kingdom on passenger 
numbers and carbon dioxide emissions. They evaluated different policy proposals using 
different elasticity levels. Mayor and Tol estimated the aviation tax in the UK had not 
significantly impacted passenger numbers in the UK and claim it has not been an effective 
policy instrument in fighting climate change. They suggest a more aggressive tax if a 
significant effect on passenger numbers is desired. (Mayor & Tol, 2007) Seetram, Song 
and Page (2014)  studied the UK aviation tax seven years later. They utilised an 
autoregressive distributed lag model to estimate the elasticities of income, price and the 
aviation tax. The study came to similar results as Mayor and Tol in 2007, estimating that 
tax had only a marginal impact. The econometric model used was a regression model 
studying tourist flows by air from the UK, using a log-linear to facilitate the interpretation 
of elasticities. The explanatory variables used were an aggregate income variable for the 
UK, a relative price variable adjusted for exchange rates, a variable for the tax, seasonal 
dummy variables, and dummy variables for extraordinary events such as the SARS 
outbreak. (Seetaram et al., 2014)  
 
This thesis is based on the paper by Falk & Hagsten (2019) in the International Journal of 
Tourism Research: Short run impact of the flight departure tax on air travel. Falk & 
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Hagsten study the impact of an aviation tax in Germany and Austria on passenger 
numbers.  
The method used is a dynamic panel difference-in-differences model and passenger 
data from 310 European airports. Since a difference-in-differences method assumes both 
the treatment group and the control group have a common trend before the treatment, the 
authors exclude airports close to the German and Austrian border from the control group. 
The main contribution of the paper is that it is the first quantitative analysis where airports 
are separated into two categories: regular airports and airports primarily trafficked by low 
cost airlines. Falk & Hagsten (2019) found that implementing a flight departure tax 
resulted in reduced passenger numbers, by 9% the year of implementation, and by 5% the 
year following. This change was primarily due to reduced traffic at airports where low-
cost airlines were dominant. The main constraint of this paper is that the effects in the 
medium and long term cannot be predicted without detailed data on alternative transport 
modes (substitutes). They also suggest recreating this study with the aviation taxes 
implemented recently in Norway and Sweden due to their relative geographic isolation. 
(Falk & Hagsten, 2019)    
3.3 Options for aviation tax design 
Fichert et al. (2014) present the two main categories of tax commonly used should a 
country decide to implement an aviation tax. The first being VAT: Value added tax can 
easily be applied for domestic flights, however, it causes some problems with international 
flights. There is no clear system for which country has jurisdiction in certain situations. 
For example, how should the cost of a round-trip ticket be divided? The cost varies 
depending on several factors and cannot be easily divided in half. For this reason, VAT is 
generally not used for international flights. 
The second tax category is a passenger volume tax. This type of tax is easier to enforce as 
it can simply be charged for every departing passenger in a country, avoiding jurisdictional 
complications. There are three main types of passenger volume tax designs: 
1. A flat rate for all departing passengers, no matter the destination, like the aviation 
tax in Norway in 2016. 
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2. Different rates depending on distance or by destination country i.e. the Swedish 
aviation tax design. 
3. Different rates depending on the type of ticket. For example, the aviation tax in 
France is higher for business class tickets than for economy tickets. (Fichert et al., 
2014)  
3.4 Possible limits on the effectiveness of an aviation tax 
Fichert, Forsyth and Niemeier discussed the limits of the effectiveness of aviation taxes 
in their paper in 2014. One such example is elasticity: The elasticity of air travel can vary 
significantly depending on trip type. In previous literature the consensus appears to be that 
low-cost (leisure) air travel has a high price elasticity, while business travel is quite 
inelastic. A flat rate aviation tax is regressive, as the effect is greater proportionally for 
lower priced tickets. This leads to the effect being larger for low-cost air travel.  
Fichert et al. (2014) bring an important point on the possible limitations of a tax 
on air travel: Capacity constraints can have a significant effect, many airports are 
operating at maximum capacity. Hypothetically the passenger capacity limit of the airport 
could be smaller than the monopoly quantity, if the airport had unlimited capacity. This 
would mean that the airport and airlines are collecting scarcity rents and a tax would only 
serve to convert some of these rents into tax revenue, with sales volume and prices 
remaining unchanged. (Fichert et al., 2014)  
An aviation tax with several tiers based on distance has a possible loophole for 
long-haul passengers. A passenger could fly to a nearby airport outside the country and 
with a separate ticket complete the journey. However, Fichert et al. (2014) found no 
evidence of this while studying the German aviation tax. (Fichert et al., 2014)  
Another possible limit on the effectiveness of an aviation tax is tax perception. 
There is evidence people do not make rational decisions when it comes to consuming, 
most famously by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) . This could impact the validity of the 
estimate. 
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4. Method and data 
To analyse if the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden decreased passenger numbers, I 
perform an econometric analysis. The analysis has three stages: Firstly, identifying a 
general effect of the aviation taxes. Secondly, identifying if airports dominated by low-
cost airlines are particularly affected. The included variables are motivated by the theory 
and previous research presented in chapters two and three. To examine if domestic air 
travel is particularly affected by the tax, separate regressions for foreign and domestic air 
travel are also included. The data used for analysis is a panel data set compiled from, 
among other sources, national statistics agencies in Nordic countries and from the 
nationally owned airport companies in Nordic countries. In this chapter I present the 
econometric methods and the sources of the data. 
4.1 Data 
The data used for passenger numbers at airports in the Nordic countries is monthly data 
from the years 2010-2019. The time period was chosen for data availability reasons. It is 
a strongly balanced panel of all commercial airports in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark, 129 airports in total.  The passenger numbers for Finland are from Finavia, for 
Sweden from Transportstyrelsen, for Norway from Statistics Norway, and for Denmark 
from Danish Transport, Construction and Housing Authority. The passenger numbers I 
will analyse are departing commercial passengers, excluding transfer passengers and 
children under the age of two. The method used is a dynamic difference-in-differences 
analysis with monthly fixed effects and airport fixed effects.  
4.1.1 Air transport passenger numbers 
Norway: Statistics Norway is the national statistical institute of Norway. The data 
retrieved from this source are passenger numbers for international and domestic flights 
departing Norway for the years 2010-2019, on a monthly basis (Statistics Norway, 2020). 
Sweden: The Swedish transportation provided monthly data on departing passenger 
numbers from Swedish airports. (Transportstyrelsen, 2020) Finland: Finavia is a publicly 
owned limited company responsible for development and maintenance of Finland’s 
airport network. The data retrieved from Finavia are monthly departing passenger 
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numbers from Finnish airports from the years 2010-2019. (Finavia, 2020) Denmark: The 
Danish Authority on transport, construction and housing provided data on monthly 
departing passenger numbers from Danish airports, the years 2010-2019. (Trafik- Bygge- 
og Boligstyrelsen, 2020)  
4.1.2 Price indices and GDP per capita 
Eurostat: A Directorate-General of the European Commission, Eurostat is responsible for 
statistical information in the EU. From Eurostat the data retrieved are the price indices for 
the consumer prices of accommodation and flight tickets. (Eurostat, 2020a) (Eurostat, 
2020b) 
International Monetary Fund: The data on GDP per capita for the years 2010–2019 is 
retrieved from the IMF Database. Data for the year 2019 is an estimate, as definite 
numbers are not available at the time of writing. (International Monetary Fund, 2019)   
4.2 Variables 
The data set is comprised of variables on passenger numbers, economic factors, as well as 
specific adjustment variables. The main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of passengers departing an airport: ln(p_total). However, I will also conduct 
the same regressions with domestic passengers only and international passengers only. 
The variables are described more in detail below: 
4.2.1 Dependent variables  
ln(p_total): The total number of passengers departing from an airport, ln(p_total) is the 
main dependent variable. The variable excludes infants under two years old, as well as 
passengers on layover. This is the data available from the selected countries and fits well 
as these exclusions apply to the taxes in place in Norway and Sweden as well.  
Using the logarithm of a variable is advised if the variable has a right skew, that is 
if the mean is larger than the median. I use the logarithm to ease the interpretation as well 
and to conform to the norm for studying passenger numbers.  
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ln(p_domestic): Additional variable from the same data as ln(p_total), containing only 
domestic departing passengers.  
 
ln(p_international): Additional variable from the same data as ln(p_total), containing only 
international departing passengers.  
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
sweden: Dummy variable where 1 = airport located in Sweden and 0 = airport located 
outside Sweden. 
 
aftertax2018: Dummy variable where 1 = after the month of implementation of the 
Swedish aviation tax in April 2019. 
 
sweden*aftertax2018: Difference-in-differences variable signifying the treatment group: 
Swedish airports, after the tax was implemented.  
 
norway*aftertax2016: Difference-in-differences variable signifying the treatment group: 
Norwegian airports, after the tax was implemented.  
 
ln(gdp_cap): GDP per capita for the different countries in logarithmic form. This variable 
functions as a control for income elasticity. Using the logarithmic form of GDP is 
consistent with previous research into aviation taxes (Falk & Hagsten, 2019) (Seetaram et 
al., 2014).  
 
hotelprice_index: An index for the price of accommodation such as hotels, hostels, and 
short-term rentals for the different Nordic countries (excluding Iceland). This variable is 
the control for possible price effects of accommodation on air transport. The control is in 
in line with the regressions of Falk & Hagsten (2019). 
 
airfare_index: An index for airfare on the country level from Eurostat. 
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4.2.3 Variables accounting for extraordinary events 
I have chosen not to include variables accounting for extraordinary events such as global 
epidemics. Thießen, Haucke and Wosnitza (2013) argue that any correction of passenger 
numbers accounting for extraordinary events is dubious. Special circumstances such as 
the SARS epidemic will occur again in the future. Additionally, during the period of study 
there have not been any extraordinary events that would impact aviation in a significant 
way. Another argument against correcting for extraordinary events is consumer 
behaviour: If there is a conflict or disease in another country, people are more likely to 
simply change their destination than to avoid flying altogether. (Thießen, Haucke, & 
Wosnitza, 2013) The time period I am using does not include a time when the COVID-19 
pandemic was affecting air travel, as the last month I am including in my analysis is 
December 2019.  
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The airports in the Nordic countries (excluding Iceland) vary in size quite radically. The 
sample includes everything from near-abandoned airports to the four main airports in the 
countries of interest.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, whole sample, 129 airports. 
 
 N mean median std. dev min max 
       
p_total 15 480 47 620 4 393 169 412 0 1.590e+06 
gdp_cap 15 480 55 204 51 742 11 750 38 732 76 684 
airfare_index 15 480 102.3 101.2 13.26 71.80 145 
hotelprice_index 15 480 103.9 102 8.31 88.83 171 
       
p_domestic 15 480 18 007 3 131 50 139 0 548 656 
p_international 15 480 29 614 24 133 659 0 1.510e+06 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics, Sweden, 41 airports.   
 N mean median std. dev min max 
       
p_total 4 920 41 872 4 251 151 146 0 1.338e+06 
gdp_cap 4 920 48 390 48 198 3 930.18 42 569 54 628 
airfare_index 4 920 99.74 99.32 13.08 76.46 142.39 
hotelprice_index 4 920 101.45 99.99 6.88 88.83 119.97 
       
p_domestic 4 920 14 720 1 368 35 966 0 262 328 
p_international 4 920 27 152 514 119 273 0 1.129e+06 
 
Where: p_total: monthly passenger numbers by airport, gdp_cap: GDP per capita by country, 
airfare_index: index of airfare by country, hotelprice_index: index of hotel prices by country, p_domestic: 
monthly domestic passenger numbers by airport, p_international: monthly international passenger 
numbers by airport. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics, Norway, 52 airports. 
 
 N mean median std. dev min max 
       
p_total 6 240 42 771 4 648 146 588 0 1.407e+06 
gdp_cap 6 240 68 364 68 155 4 723 61 513 76 684 
airfare_index 6 240 101.20 100.4 14.51 71.8 145 
hotelprice_index 6 240 104.28 104 4.26 93.9 116.5 
       
p_domestic 6 240 25 479 4 532 68 867 0 548 656 
p_international 6 240 17 292 0 81 409 0 949 022 
 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics, Finland, 25 airports. 
 
 N mean median std. dev min max 
       
p_total 3 000 34 752 2 977 139 726 0 1.042e+06 
gdp_cap 3 000 42 451.3 41 119 2 883.38 38 732 47 975 
airfare_index 3 000 107.82 108.29 10.22 84.48 134.76 
hotelprice_index 3 000 105.70 101.28 11.37 90.32 138.37 
       
p_domestic 3 000 8 860 2 369 22 502 0 164 762 
p_international 3 000 25 892 358 119 259 0 941 856 
 
 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics, Denmark, 11 airports. 
 
 N mean median std. dev min max 
       
p_total 1 320 121 212 9 176 315 518 0 1.589e+06 
gdp_cap 1 320 47 370.2 46 999 3 800.64 41 947 53 882 
airfare_index 1 320 103.96 101.75 9.52 83 135.6 
hotelprice_index 1 320 107.24 102.25 14.59 90.2 171 
       
p_domestic 1 320 15 721 7 177 24 349 0 116 082 
p_international 1 320 105 492 771 293 898 0 1.510e+06 
 
 
Where: p_total: monthly passenger numbers by airport, gdp_cap: GDP per capita by country, 
airfare_index: index of airfare by country, hotelprice_index: index of hotel prices by country,  
p_domestic: monthly domestic passenger numbers by airport,  
p_international: monthly international passenger numbers by airport. 
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4.4 Method 
The established way in economics to study the behavioural effects of a tax is using a 
statistical regression model. The method I am using is a dynamic difference-in-differences 
regression model with monthly fixed effects and airport-specific fixed effects to study if 
the aviation taxes reduce passenger numbers in Norway and Sweden, despite the 
geographical isolation of the Nordic countries. The model is based on the methods 
established by Falk & Hagsten (2019) who studied the impact of the Austrian and German 
aviation taxes on passenger numbers. According to Falk & Hagsten (2019) and Fichert et 
al. (2014) the impact of aviation taxes is greater at airports dominated by low-cost airports, 
therefore I am doing an additional model as well, separated by airport characteristics. 
Fichert et al. (2014) as well as Jung and Fujii (1976) claim the distance traveled can impact 
the price elasticity of air travel. For this reason, I include additional regressions separating 
the passenger numbers by domestic and international travel. All the regressions are 
summarised in table 7 and they are all completed utilizing robust standard errors. 
4.4.1 Dynamic difference-in-differences regression models with fixed effects 
The OLS-regressions I am using are to estimate the effect of the independent variable, the 
aviation tax, on the dependent variable, air traffic passenger numbers. I chose a dynamnic 
difference-in-differences analysis to account for general trends in aviation passenger 
numbers in the Nordic countries. Falk and Hagsten (2019) utilised a dynamic difference-
in-differences model as well, when studying the impact of aviation taxes in Germany and 
Austria. 
A difference-in-differences regression model is a statistical model designed to emulate an 
experimental research design. With the model one can study the effects of a natural 
experiment using a “treatment group” and “control group”. The regression model 
calculates the difference of the treated group with a group that has not received the 
treatment, over time. In this thesis the countries with aviation taxes are the treatment 
groups (in separate models) and the untaxed countries are the control group. One of the 
most important factors in utilising a difference-in-differences regression model is to 
choose a valid control group.  
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A Difference-in-differences method is based on the assumption of a common 
trend. In figure 5 the common trend of the Nordic countries air transport passenger 
numbers can be seen in absolute terms. While the common trend assumption appears to 
break when it comes to Finland, this is primarily due to the lower number of passengers 
flying from Finland. In figure 6, I overlay the passenger trends in the countries visualising 
the common trend. Combined with the fact that Finland is similarly geographically 
isolated as the treatment groups, I believe it is a functioning control group for models on 
both the Norwegian and Swedish tax. This is due to the countries’ geographical proximity, 
cultural similarity and demographic similarity. To account for Finland possibly not having 
the perfect common trend, I include regressions without Finland included in the control 
group in Appendix A. However, as Denmark is not as geographically isolated as the other 
countries of interest, I estimate regressions without Denmark included. All the alternative 
regressions can be found in Appendix A, tables 1-4.  
 
Figure 5 Monthly departing air transport passengers in the Nordic countries (excluding 
Iceland). 
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Figure 6 The common trend of monthly departing air transport passengers in the Nordic 
countries visualised. N.B. There is no scale on the Y-axis as this graph exists purely to 
visualise the common trend. 
 
 
Utilising fixed effects in panel data is done to control for omitted variable bias. Since the 
data is airport-level data the specific characteristics of the airport could have an impact on 
the estimate. I am therefore utilising fixed effects to account for the heterogeneity of 
airport characteristics in the studied countries. I performed a Hausman specification test 
in Stata and verified that a fixed effects method is the correct choice for the data. The 
Hausman specification test can be used to decide if one should use fixed effects or random 
effects in a panel data regression (Hausman, 1978). The test compares estimable 
coefficients of regressors that vary over time and was performed with the sigmamore 
option as recommended by Cameron & Trivedi (2009). The sigmamore option for the 
Hausman specification test option specifies that the covariance matrices of both 
estimators, fixed and random effects, are based on the estimated disturbance variance of 
the efficient estimator. This is essentially done to prevent the chi squared test from taking 
on a negative value. (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009)  
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4.4.2 Empirical models 
The general specification for analysis of the aviation tax in Sweden is as follows: 
 
ln(𝑝_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2018𝑡  + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2018𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ ln(𝑝_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡−12 + 𝛽5 ∙ ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∙ ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
This concerns models (1), (2) and (3). Where the dependent variable is ln(p_total)it, 
departing passengers in logarithmic form, i is the individual airport, and t the month, 
swedeni is a dummy variable for if an airport is in Sweden or not, aftertax2018t is a dummy 
variable for time after the aviation tax was implemented in Sweden. Additionally, swedeni 
* aftertax2018t is the treatment group variable after treatment, Swedish airports after the 
tax. There are also three other control variables: ln(GDPcap)i, GDP per capita in 
logarithmic form, airfare_indexi, an index for airfare, as well as hotel_indexi, an index for 
accommodation prices in the different countries. The variable αi represents the unobserved 
effect, unrelated to the time variable, of each airport. The variable δt represents the time 
effects that impact all airports, such as the business cycle. All models studying the 
Swedish aviation tax exclude Norway from the control group due to the Norwegian 
aviation tax. The control group for Sweden is therefore Finland and Denmark. The model 
for Sweden excludes two airports due to their close proximity to the Swedish-Danish 
border: Copenhagen airport and Malmö airport. I do this to account for the possible effect 
of people traveling over the border by land to fly from Denmark. 
 Model (A1) includes all airports in the sample. Model (A2) only includes airports 
dominated by low-cost airlines. Model (A3) includes all airports where low-cost airlines 
are present. The airports included in each regression can be seen in Appendix B. 
 
For Norway, the general specification for analysis is: 
ln(𝑝_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2016𝑡  + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2016𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ ln(𝑝_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡−12 + 𝛽5 ∙ ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∙ ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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The model is functionally identical to the model for Sweden. I study only the Norwegian 
aviation tax implemented in 2016, denoted aftertax2016t. The tax raise in 2019 is too 
recent for analysis. Here norwayi*aftertax2016t is a dummy variable denoting an airport 
in Norway after the tax.  This model does not exclude any airports due to close border 
proximity, as Norway is geographically very isolated. 
Model (B1) includes all airports in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Model 
(B2) only includes airports dominated by low-cost airlines. Model (B3) includes all 
airports where low-cost airlines are present. All the models for Norway are restricted to 
the time before the Swedish aviation tax came into effect in April 2018. 
 
For all models I adjust the passenger amounts ln(p_total) seasonally to yield better results. 
I add dummy variables for each month as a seasonal adjustment, in line with most research 
on tourism and travel. Additionally, I add a lag term in line with previous research: The 
lag term lnptotalit-12 is added to predict the passenger amounts in a particular month using 
the same month in the previous year, as consumers are slow to react to price changes in 
tourism industries and holidays are often planned a year in advance (Fichert et al., 2014). 
Due to the nature of the lag variable the year 2010 is excluded, leaving the years 2011-
2019. 
 
4.4.3 International and domestic air travel 
Jung and Fujii found that air travel is more elastic for short-haul destinations. To account 
for this possibility, I perform the regressions separating air travel by domestic and 
international to isolate the possible effect of the taxes on short-haul travel. The regressions 
for domestic air travel are C1-C3 for Sweden and D1-D3 for Norway. For international 
air travel the regressions for Sweden are E1-E3 and for F1-F3 for Norway. A summary of 
all the regressions can be seen in table 7.  
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Table 7 Summary of regressions.  
 
Regression 
code 
Treatment 
group 
Airports included Type of air transport 
passengers included 
Control group 
    
Main regressions    
A1 SWE all all passengers FIN+DEN 
A2 SWE low-cost dominated all passengers FIN+DEN 
A3 SWE low-cost present all passengers FIN+DEN 
     
B1 NOR all all passengers FIN+DEN+SWE 
B2 NOR low-cost dominated all passengers FIN+DEN+SWE 
B3 NOR low-cost present all passengers FIN+DEN+SWE 
     
Domestic air travel passengers only 
C1 SWE all domestic only FIN+DEN 
C2 SWE low-cost dominated domestic only FIN+DEN 
C3 SWE low-cost present domestic only FIN+DEN 
     
D1 NOR all domestic only FIN+DEN+SWE 
D2 NOR low-cost dominated domestic only FIN+DEN+SWE 
D3 NOR low-cost present domestic only FIN+DEN+SWE 
     
International air travel passengers only 
E1 SWE all international only FIN+DEN 
E2 SWE low-cost dominated international only FIN+DEN 
E3 SWE low-cost present international only FIN+DEN 
     
F1 NOR all international only FIN+DEN+SWE 
F2 NOR low-cost dominated international only FIN+DEN+SWE 
F3 NOR low-cost present international only FIN+DEN+SWE 
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5. Results 
In this chapter I present the results of the econometric models presented in the previous 
chapter. The models follow the methods established by Falk and Hagsten (2019). 
5.1 The Swedish aviation tax 2018 
In table 8 the three dynamic difference-in-differences regressions studying the Swedish 
aviation tax can be seen (with Finland and Denmark functioning as the control group). 
Regression A1 includes all airports in the sample. Regression A2 includes only airports 
dominated by low-cost airlines. Regression A3 includes only airports where low-cost 
airlines are present. The airports included in each regression can be seen in Appendix B. 
In each model the effect of the variable for the tax, swedeni*aftertax2018t, on the 
dependent variable ln(p_total)it, can be seen.  
 
I find no significant connection between the Swedish aviation tax implemented in 2018 
and overall passenger numbers (A1). The same is true when only studying airports with a 
low-cost airline presence (A3) and when only accounting for airports dominated by low-
cost airlines (A2). The 12-month lag is the most consistent variable estimating passenger 
numbers, significant in regressions (A1) and (A3), and with a weak correlation for 
equation (A2). This is to be expected due to the strong seasonality and the generally slow 
reactions of the air transport market. 
 The increase in the price of airfare, airfare_index appears to slightly increase the 
number of passengers departing from airports dominated by low-cost airlines. This 
indicates passengers are choosing cheaper air travel as prices increase, valuing the cheap 
prices over the comfort of more premium airlines. 
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Table 8 The effect of the aviation tax in Sweden on passenger numbers. Monthly and 
airport fixed effects for the time period 2011-2019. 
 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
sweden*after -0.022 0.116 -0.006 
 (0.057) (0.174) (0.059) 
 
aftertax2018 -0.036 -0.024 -0.006 
 (0.077) (0.180) (0.056) 
 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.660*** 0.527* 0.675*** 
 (0.054) (0.209) (0.129) 
 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.445 0.966 0.354 
 (0.459) (0.644) (0.233) 
 
airfare_index -0.001 0.005** 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
hotelprice_index 0.004** -0.016 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
 
Constant 7.399 -5.034 -0.549 
 (4.740) (8.142) (3.205) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 7 219 490 1 030 
R-squared 0.412 0.659 0.673 
Number of airports 73 5 10 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
sweden*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2018: after April 2018. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
5.2 The Norwegian aviation tax 2016 
The aviation taxes implemented in Norway in 2016 did not have a statistically significant 
impact on passenger numbers, as presented in table 9. The coefficient for the tax, 
norway*after is negative but not significant with quite large standard errors. The results 
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are in line with hypothesis 1, that the aviation taxes did not decrease passenger numbers, 
but due to large standard errors not definitively proven. Hypothesis 2, that the aviation 
taxes decreased passenger numbers at airports dominated by low-cost airlines, is not 
proven. The results for the aviation tax are equally weak in the case of airports dominated 
by low-cost airlines and airports with low-cost airlines present. 
 In line with the results for Sweden, the lag variables are statistically significant 
and positive, indicating a general increasing trend for all air travel passengers. The 
variable for the time period after the Norwegian aviation, aftertax2016, tax is significant 
only for the airports with a low-cost presence and for airports dominated by low-cost 
airlines. 
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Table 9 The effect of the aviation tax in Norway on passenger numbers. Monthly and 
airport fixed effects for the time period January 2011 – March 2018. 
 
 (B1) (B2) (B3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
norway*after -0.039 -0.106 -0.045 
 (0.032) (0.115) (0.069) 
 
aftertax2016 0.091 0.213*** 0.086** 
 (0.058) (0.052) (0.034) 
 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.690*** 0.513** 0.632*** 
 (0.045) (0.196) (0.133) 
 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.706 -0.762 -0.250 
 (0.499) (0.482) (0.241) 
 
airfare_index -0.001* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
hotelprice_index 0.000 -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) 
 
Constant 10.38* 14.28* 6.793* 
 (5.291) (7.108) (3.249) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 10 451 650 1 346 
R-squared 0.429 0.615 0.651 
Number of airports 127 8 16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
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5.3 Regressions on domestic air travel 
5.3.1 Swedish aviation tax, domestic travel only 
The regressions for domestic air travel only indicate that the Swedish aviation tax may 
have a significant effect on flights in the low-cost segment, as displayed in table 10. The 
tax appears to reduce domestic air travel by 12.6%1 when studying airports that have a 
low-cost presence (C3). However, when looking at airports primarily operated by low-
cost airlines this effect disappears (C2). The results when looking at domestic air travel 
only are similar to Falk and Hagsten (2019), with the tax having more of an effect on the 
low-cost segment. 
 The variable for the lag, ln(p_total)it-12 is significant in line with the other 
regressions (A1-B3) but only when accounting for all airport types. The lag indicates a 
generally increasing trend for air travel in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 
 The variable for GDP per capita is negative and significant, which would indicate 
that if GDP per capita increases with 1%, domestic air travel decreases by 1.7%. A 
possible reason could be travellers choosing to travel internationally in times when the 
economy is stronger.  
  
 
1 Calculation based on coefficient for sweden*after = -0.135 as seen in table 10: (e-0.135-1) ∙100 = -12.63 
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Table 10 The effect of the aviation tax in Sweden on domestic passenger numbers. 
Monthly and airport fixed effects for the time period 2011-2019. 
 
 (C1) (C2) (C3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
sweden*after -0.213 -0.424 -0.135** 
 (0.164) (0.213) (0.050) 
aftertax2018 -0.016 0.359 0.060 
 (0.123) (0.338) (0.061) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.532*** 0.331 0.355* 
 (0.112) (0.240) (0.158) 
ln(gdp_cap) -1.732** -0.328 -1.020* 
 (0.669) (1.150) (0.480) 
airfare_index 0.000 0.005 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
hotelprice_index 0.006* -0.009 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.005) 
Constant 20.87*** 4.736 14.35** 
 (6.979) (10.73) (4.591) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 7 351 502 1 042 
R-squared 0.168 0.038 0.042 
Number of airports 74 5 10 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
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5.3.1 Norwegian aviation tax, domestic travel only 
I performed the same regressions, studying only domestic air travel, for Norway. In table 
11 the effect of the Norwegian aviation tax on domestic air passengers can be seen. The 
aviation tax appears to have reduced domestic air travel in Norway by 24.1%2. This is 
consistent with Jung & Fujii (1976), short-haul routes being the most elastic. The results 
are unexpected because Norway is so geographically isolated. Norway is mountainous 
and traveling within the country by land is challenging. I did not expect the tax to reduce 
passenger numbers on domestic routes in Norway.  
 The variable for the lag, ln(p_total)it-12, is significant in line with the main 
regressions (A1-B3) but only when accounting for all airport types. The lag indicates a 
generally increasing trend for air travel in the Nordic countries (excluding Iceland). 
 Here, as in the regression for Sweden, the variable for GDP per capita is negative 
and significant, but only when accounting for all airports. The results mean that an 
increase of 1% in GDP per capita would decrease domestic air travel by 2.7%. As with 
Sweden I believe this is caused by air travellers substituting domestic air travel for 
international air travel when the economy is booming.  
 
2 Calculation based on coefficient for norway*after = -0.276 as seen in table 11: (e-0.279-1) ∙100 = -24.12 
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Table 11 The effect of the aviation tax in Norway on domestic passenger numbers. 
Monthly and airport fixed effects for the time period 2011-2019. 
 
 (D1) (D2) (D3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
norway*after -0.276** -1.282 -0.966 
 (0.135) (0.956) (0.829) 
aftertax2016 0.215** 0.769 0.490 
 (0.087) (0.449) (0.377) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.595*** 0.162 0.297 
 (0.103) (0.304) (0.186) 
ln(gdp_cap) -2.737*** -13.14 -6.491 
 (0.938) (11.31) (5.254) 
airfare_index -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) 
hotelprice_index -0.001 0.045 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.011) 
Constant 32.63*** 142.9 75.07 
 (9.937) (120.2) (58.19) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 10 620 674 1 370 
R-squared 0.142 0.136 0.088 
Number of airports 128 8 16 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport.  
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5.4 Regressions on international travel 
The regressions on international air travel yielded no significant results for the variables 
of interest. No previous studies have found international air travel to be particularly elastic 
compared to domestic air travel. The results can be seen in Appendix I, tables 5 and 6. 
5.5 Discussion 
The variables of interest did not yield significant results for the main regressions. This 
indicates that the price elasticity of air travel in Norway and Sweden is inelastic as a whole. 
The countries are quite geographically isolated which would explain the aviation taxes 
having no effect on overall passenger numbers. 
 
When looking at exclusively domestic air travel, the effect of the variable for the tax 
becomes significant in some of the regressions. For Sweden, this is the case when studying 
domestic air travel from airports that have a low-cost presence (C3). The tax appears to 
have reduced domestic travel from these airports by over 10%. For Norway, the effect is 
present when studying air travel from all airports (D1). The Norwegian aviation tax 
appears to reduce domestic air travel by 24%. This is unexpected, as Norway is more 
geographically isolated than Sweden, Denmark and Finland.  
 
To ensure the assumption of a common trend is valid I perform the regressions excluding 
certain countries from the control group. The results of the alternative regressions can be 
seen in Appendix I, tables 1-4. The alternative regressions provide differing results to the 
main regressions, implying some heterogeneity in the control group. 
5.6 Critique & Limitations 
Due to high standard errors I can not draw any conclusions about the overall effect or lack 
thereof of the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden. One of the possible limitations of 
this thesis is omitted variable bias: A possible cause of omitted variable bias in the 
regressions studying Sweden is the concept gaining ground in recent years: “flygskam”, 
Swedish for flight shame. Flygskam can be defined as feeling guilty about the 
environmental harm of flying, it is a symbolic movement of Swedish people that are 
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avoiding flying (Wolrath Söderberg & Wormbs, 2019). This movement could impact the 
results of the regression analysis. The effects of flygskam are hard to quantify and as such 
have not been accounted for. In Figure 7 the search interest for the term can be seen. It is 
measured on an index of 0 to 100 based on search interest. The greyed out part of the 
graph is outside the time period being analysed.  
 
 
Figure 7 Search interest for the term “flygskam”, index 0—100. (Google Inc., 2020)  
 
Another possible limitation is the fact that the treatment group countries border the control 
group countries. In the regressions (A1), (A2) and (A3) Sweden is the treatment group 
and Denmark and Finland are the control group. Swedish air passengers travel frequently 
to the control group countries. If the aviation tax reduces passenger numbers in Sweden, 
the Swedish aviation tax could in theory reduce passenger numbers in the control group 
countries as well. This would violate the principle of independence for the control group. 
The same issue is present with the regressions for Norway, (B1), (B2), and (B3), as 
Norwegians fly to the control group countries as well. To combat this possible bias, I 
suggest future studies find a way to remove the effect of air travel between the treatment 
and control countries. 
 
An additional border effect is the possibility that air passengers travel by land to other 
countries to fly. Due to the geographical isolation in the Nordic countries I believe this 
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not to be a big problem with most airports. As previously stated, the only airports where 
this is a possible problem are Malmö and Copenhagen airports. I exclude them from the 
regressions on the Swedish aviation tax. 
 These border effects are not a problem for the regressions exclusively studying 
domestic traffic. Therefore, the results for the regressions C1-C3 and D1-D3 do not suffer 
from this problem. 
 
The variable for airfare, airfare_index, could be problematic. It is connected to the 
variables for the taxes, sweden*after and norway*after. Due to the very small effect of the 
variable airfare_index I determine this problem does not affect the regression results in a 
significant way.  
 
The lack of detailed price statistics on airfare is problematic as well. Business travel and 
leisure travel have different elasticities and react differently to taxes. More detailed 
statistics are desired when it comes to air journeys as well. Being able to control for 
different types of routes would make the results more robust. 
 
  
 Emil Warras  
38 
 
6. Conclusions 
This thesis aims to study whether the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden decreased 
passenger numbers. In previous studies the results have varied. Falk and Hagsten (2019) 
found the aviation taxes in Germany and Austria decreased passenger numbers. Mayor 
and Tol (2007) found no impact when studying the impact of the aviaton tax on passenger 
numbers in the United Kingdom. Seetaram et al. (2014) found similar results studying the 
aviation tax in the United Kingdom in 2014. 
 
In the results of the dynamic difference-in-differences regression models studying all air 
travel (A1-B3) I find no significant effect by the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden on 
total passenger numbers, nor can I definitively confirm an effect does not exist. The high 
standard errors prevent any definite conclusions from being drawn. The main hypothesis, 
that the aviation taxes did not have an effect on passenger numbers, can therefore not be 
disproved based on the results. The results indicate that the taxes probably did not have a 
significant effect on passenger numbers. A possible reason for the non-significant results 
is the relatively low monetary amount of the tax. The geographic isolation of the countries 
could reduce the effect of the tax as well. The secondary hypothesis, “The aviation taxes 
had a significant effect on passenger numbers at airports dominated by low-cost airports.”, 
can not be disproven either. The main regressions (A1-B3) are attempting to recreate the 
study by Falk and Hagsten (2019). In addition, I completed some modified regressions. 
 
I study the effect of the aviation taxes in Norway and Sweden on domestic air travel 
passenger numbers. This is done to account for the possibility that air travel is more elastic 
for short-haul journeys. The results for Sweden indicate that the tax reduces domestic air 
travel by 12.6% for airports with a low-cost presence. For Norway, the results indicate 
that the Norwegian aviation tax reduces domestic air travel by 24.1%, for all airports in 
Norway. The results are in line with Jung and Fujii (1976). However, domestic air travel 
can also be influenced by the availability of substitutes, which this thesis does not control 
for. The results for aviation taxes could be an effective measure for reducing domestic air 
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travel. The results are not conclusive, as the effect was significant only for two out of the 
six domestic air travel regressions. 
 
Pigouvian taxes still remain relevant to this day as a possible measure in mitigating the 
damage of negative externalities. One of the goals of aviation taxes is to reduce passenger 
numbers, to reduce emissions. Should the reduction of passenger numbers not succeed, 
the tax is effective from a different perspective, as a revenue collection tool for the state. 
For air travel, the potential of the tax to reduce passenger numbers appears to be the most 
effective for domestic flights. 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing research by applying robust statistical methods to 
study the effect of the aviation taxes in Sweden and Norway on passenger numbers. 
Further research is needed into the effect of aviation taxes on passenger numbers.  
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Summary in Swedish – Svensk sammanfattning 
Inledning 
Att undvika en global temperaturökning på 2 grader Celsius är ett av de huvudsakliga 
målen i kampen mot klimatförändringen. En viktig faktor i sammanhanget är minskandet 
av koldioxidutsläpp. (Bows‐Larkin, Mander, Traut, Anderson, & Wood, 2010) Flygandet 
drabbar klimatet relativt hårt: trots att flyg konsumerar endast tre procent av världens 
fossila bränslen står de för tolv procent av koldioxidutsläppen. (Simone, Stettler, & 
Barrett, 2013).  
Klimatförändringen har bidragit till ökad ekologisk lagstiftning. (Kumar, 
Ugirashebuja, Carnwath, Tamminen, & Boyd, 2019). Sveriges flygskatt som 
implementerades i april 2018 har varit bland de mest diskuterade lagarna de senaste åren. 
Skatten varierar mellan 60 och 400 SEK beroende på slutdestinationen.  Ett annat land i 
Norden, Norge, implementerade en flygskatt på 80 NOK år 2016. Norge höjde sin 
flygskatt år 2019 för att i stora drag motsvara Sveriges. Flygtrafiken har globalt sett många 
skatteförmåner, bl.a. är flygbränsle skattefritt. (Fichert, Forsyth, & Niemeier, 2014) 
Flygskatternas syfte är att få flygbolagen att till större del bära flygutsläppens ekologiska 
kostnader. (Andersson & Falck, 2017) 
Syfte och ämnesmotivering 
I denna avhandling studerar jag om dessa skatter minskat antalet flygresenärer i respektive 
land. Jag utnyttjar en ekonometrisk difference-in-differences-metod med fixa effekter. 
Huvudsakligen studerar jag skatterna som implementerades 2016 i Norge och 2018 i 
Sverige. Skattehöjningen 2019 skedde alltför nyligen för att kunna ligga som grund för en 
ekonometrisk analys. Jag utnyttjar en difference-in-differences-metod i enlighet med Falk 
& Hagsten (2019). Jag utför även samma analys med endast inrikesflyg i syfte att isolera 
skatternas effekt på kortare flygrutter. Min kontribution är en analys av flygskatterna i 
Norden med hjälp av robusta statistiska metoder. Jag utnyttjar data på månads- och 
flygplatsnivå. Norden är mer isolerad än Centraleuropa så möjligheten att isolera effekten 
av flygskatterna är större.  
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Med utgångspunkt i tidigare forskning har jag följande hypoteser: 
1. Flygskatterna i Norge och Sverige har minskat antalet flygresenärer på en 
statistiskt signifikant nivå endast vid flygplatser som är huvudsakligen för 
lågprisflyg. 
2. Flygskatterna i Norge och Sverige har inte minskat antalet flygresenärer på en 
statistiskt signifikant nivå när alla flygplatser beaktas. 
Hypotes nr. 1 är i enlighet med Falk & Hagsten (2019).  
Min tredje hypotes är en nollhypotes: 
3. Flygskatterna i Norge och Sverige har inte påverkat antalet flygresenärer på en 
statistiskt signifikant nivå. 
Nollhypotesen är i enlighet med studien av Seetaram, Song och Page i Storbritannien. 
(Seetaram, Song, & Page, 2014) 
 
Utsläppen från flygtrafiken är ett exempel på en negativ externalitet. Det finns ett antal 
olika sätt för länder att bekämpa negativa externaliteter. Pigou (1920) föreslog en skatt på 
negativa externaliteter och att den skatten ska motsvara välfärdsförlusten som den 
negativiteten gav upphov till. En skatt av denna typ kallas en Pigouviansk skatt. (Pigou, 
1920) 
 Ett annat sätt att bekämpa negativa externaliteter är utsläppshandel enligt det så 
kallade ”Cap and trade”-systemet som används i hela Europeiska ekonomiska 
samarbetsområdet. Systemet som heter European Union Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) går ut på försäljning och köp av en begränsad mängd utsläppsrättigheter. En del 
länder har i bruk en Pigouviansk skatt på flygtrafik och är dessutom med i EU ETS. 
 När ett land vill beskatta en negativ externalitet bör den underliggande varans 
elasticitet beaktas. Efterfrågans elasticitet beskriver hur mycket en prisförändring 
påverkar efterfrågan på varan. När det kommer till flygtrafiken har olika 
konsumentgrupper väldigt olika elasticitet. T.ex. affärsresor är väldigt oelastiska.  
 
Det finns ett antal tidigare studier om flygskatters effektivitet. Områden som är mer 
geografiskt isolerade verkar ha en oelastisk efterfrågan på flygtrafik. Mayor och Tol 
(2007) studerade effekten av en flygskatt i Storbritannien på passagerarantal och utsläpp. 
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De estimerade att flygskatten inte hade någon signifikant effekt och att skatten inte var ett 
effektivt instrument i att minska mängden utsläpp. De föreslog en mer aggressiv skatt om 
en utsläppsminskning önskades (Mayor & Tol, 2007) I en liknande studie år 2013 kom 
Seetaram, Song och Page fram till motsvarande resultat. (Seetaram et al., 2014)  
 En av de bästa studierna av flygskatter i Europa gjordes av Falk och Hagsten 
(2019). De studerade hur flygskatter påverkade antalet flygresenärer i Tyskland och 
Österrike med hjälp av en difference-in-differences-modell. Studien delade upp 
flygplatser enligt flygplatser som dominerades av lågprisflyg och övriga flygplatser. 
Studien fann en minskning i passagerarantal som en konsekvens av skatten: 9 procent året 
efter att skatten implementerades och 5 procent påföljande år. Minskningen gällde främst 
flygplatserna som dominerades av lågprisflyg. Falk och Hagsten rekommenderade en 
reproduktion av studien med flygskatterna i Norden som fokus. I min analys gör jag en 
liknande uppdelning. (Falk & Hagsten, 2019) 
Metod och data 
Data om passagerarantal är balanserad paneldata hämtade från Transportstyrelsen 
(Sverige), Finavia (Finland), Statistisk Sentralbyrå (Norge), och Transport- og 
Boligministeriet (Danmark). Studien omfattar åren 2010–2019 på månadsnivå och 129 
flygplatser. Analysen gäller avgående passagerare, exklusive passagerare på 
mellanlandning. 
 Prisindex på hotell och flygbiljetter som jag utnyttjar är från Eurostat (Eurostat, 
2020). Data om BNP per capita är hämtade från Internationella Valutafonden 
(International Monetary Fund, 2019). 
 
Metoden är en dynamisk difference-in-differences-regression med månadsfixa effekter. 
Målsättningen är en analys av hur flygskatterna påverkar passagerarantalet i Norge och 
Sverige, uppdelat enligt flygplatsernas typ. Variablerna som inkluderas i analysen är 
motiverade av tidigare forskning. 
 Den beroende variabeln är logaritmerat passagerarantal på flygplatsnivå. Följande 
oberoende variabler inkluderas i modellerna: 
csweden*after2018: Flygplatser i Sverige efter flygskatten implementerades år 2018. 
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cnorway*after2016: Flygplatser i Norge efter flygskatten implementerades år 2016. 
airfare_index:  Index för pris på flygbiljetter. 
accommodation_index: Index för pris på hotell och motsvarande tjänster. 
 
Effekten av flygskatten i Sverige 2018 studeras med tre olika modeller: 
A1 Alla flygplatser i Danmark och Finland som kontrollgrupp. 
A2 Inkluderar endast flygplatser som är huvudsakligen för lågprisflyg. 
A3 Inkluderar endast flygplatser som är trafikerade av lågprisflyg, men som även 
kan ha mycket övrig trafik. 
 
Modellen för Sverige är uppbyggd på följande sätt: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2018𝑡  + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑐𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2018𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−12 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∙ ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Effekten av flygskatten i Norge 2016 studeras med tre olika modeller: 
B1 Alla flygplatser i Sverige, Danmark och Finland som kontrollgrupp 
B2 Inkluderar endast flygplatser som är huvudsakligen för lågprisflyg. 
B3 Inkluderar endast flygplatser som är trafikerade av lågprisflyg, men som även 
kan ha mycket övrig trafik. 
 
Modellen för Norge är uppbyggd på följande sätt: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2016𝑡  + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑥2016𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−12 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∙ ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Dessa samma regressioner utförs även med endast inrikesflyg (modellerna C1–C3 och 
D1–D3) samt endast utrikesflyg (Appendix A, modellerna 5–6) 
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Analys och resultat 
Svenska flygskatten 2018 
Jag hittar ingen signifikant korrelation mellan den svenska flygskatten 2018 och totala 
passagerarantal (modell A1). Samma gäller modellerna A2 och A3. Dock finns det en 
signifikant effekt på inrikesflyg när man endast beaktar flygplatser som trafikeras delvis 
av lågprisflyg. Enligt min modell minskar skatten passagerarantal från flygplatser av 
denna typ med 12,6%.  
 
Norska flygskatten 2016 
Flygskatten som implementerades i Norge år 2016 hade inte någon statistiskt signifikant 
effekt på totala passagerarantal (B1). Även för flygplatser som huvudsakligen trafikeras 
av lågprisflyg (modell B2) var effekten noll. Samma gällde flygplatser som delvis 
trafikeras av lågprisflyg (modell B3). Även här är effekten av flygskatten statistiskt 
signifikant endast när det gäller inrikesflyg. Effekten är signifikant endast när alla 
flygplatser i Norge beaktas. Flygskatten minskar inrikesflyg i Norge med 24,1% enligt 
min modell. 
 
Flygskatterna i Norge och Sverige verkar inte ha en effekt på totala passagerarantal. 
Effekten är inte heller signifikant på flygplatser som huvudsakligen trafikeras av 
lågprisflyg. Detta betyder att de har misslyckats som miljöskatter. Detta kan bero på 
ländernas geografiskt sett isolerade läge jämfört med Centraleuropa, eller skatternas 
relativt låga summa. 
 Intressant nog minskar skatterna på mängden passagerare på inrikesflyg, men inte 
totala mängden passagerare. Flygresor verkar vara mer elastiska på kortare sträckor. 
 
Pigouvianska skatter är även idag relevanta i kampen mot negativa externaliteter. 
Ytterligare studier med tillgång till mer detaljerade data behövs för bättre estimat på 
effekterna av flygskatterna i Norden. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Additional regressions 
Table 1 The effect of the Swedish aviation tax on passenger numbers. Alternative control 
group: Denmark. Concerning regression (A2): Denmark has no airports in the category 
“Low-cost dominated”. 
 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
sweden*after -0.134** -0.090 -0.047 
 (0.051) (0.064) (0.067) 
aftertax2018 0.115 - 0.004 
 (0.081)  (0.080) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.650*** 0.682*** 0.727*** 
 (0.062) (0.047) (0.022) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.818 0.112 0.402 
 (0.510) (0.393) (0.235) 
airfare_index -0.003** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
hotelprice_index 0.004*** 0.008 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
Constant 11.60** 0.658 -1.636 
 (5.242) (4.439) (2.549) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 5 120 324 756 
R-squared 0.381 0.824 0.819 
Number of airports 49 3 7 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
sweden*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2018: after April 2018. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
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Table 2 The effect of the Swedish aviation tax on passenger numbers. Alternative control 
group: Finland 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
sweden*after 0.035 0.116 -0.025 
 (0.080) (0.174) (0.069) 
aftertax2018 -0.087 -0.024 0.012 
 (0.088) (0.180) (0.066) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.671*** 0.527* 0.663*** 
 (0.057) (0.209) (0.148) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.515 0.966 0.983* 
 (0.731) (0.644) (0.469) 
airfare_index -0.001 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
hotelprice_index 0.004 -0.016 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant 7.964 -5.034 -6.728 
 (7.390) (8.142) (5.118) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 6 147 490 706 
R-squared 0.425 0.659 0.655 
Number of airports 63 5 7 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
sweden*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2018: after April 2018. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
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Table 3 The effect of the Norwegian aviation tax on passenger numbers. Alternative 
control group: Finland and Sweden 
 
 (D1) (D2) (D3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
norway*after -0.071** -0.106 -0.068 
 (0.033) (0.115) (0.073) 
aftertax2016 0.139** 0.213*** 0.130** 
 (0.066) (0.052) (0.050) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.704*** 0.513** 0.599*** 
 (0.044) (0.196) (0.151) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.864 -0.762 -0.288 
 (0.546) (0.482) (0.320) 
airfare_index -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
hotelprice_index -0.002 -0.015 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) 
Constant 12.19** 14.28* 7.973* 
 (5.886) (7.108) (4.233) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 9 502 650 998 
R-squared 0.444 0.615 0.619 
Number of airports 116 8 12 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport.  
 
 
  
 Emil Warras  
53 
 
Table 4 The effect of the Norwegian aviation tax on passenger numbers. Alternative 
control group: Denmark and Sweden 
 
 (D1) (D2) (D3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
norway*after -0.012 -0.114 -0.042 
 (0.032) (0.105) (0.070) 
aftertax2016 0.074 0.157*** 0.082** 
 (0.066) (0.031) (0.032) 
ln(p_total)it-12 0.683*** 0.629*** 0.677*** 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.046) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.771 -0.617 -0.190 
 (0.541) (0.308) (0.226) 
airfare_index -0.001*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
hotelprice_index 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Constant 11.19* 10.14** 5.634** 
 (5.670) (3.378) (2.303) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 8 741 505 1 114 
R-squared 0.396 0.749 0.776 
Number of airports 103 6 13 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport.  
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Table 5 The effect of the aviation tax in Sweden on international passenger numbers. 
Monthly and airport fixed effects for the time period 2011-2019. 
 
 (E1) (E2) (E3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
sweden*after 0.131 -0.944 -0.167 
 (0.169) (0.989) (0.137) 
aftertax2018 -0.054 1.198 0.169 
 (0.187) (1.287) (0.202) 
ln(p_total)it-12 1.092*** 1.492* 1.420** 
 (0.147) (0.566) (0.465) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.531 5.149 0.659 
 (0.822) (2.627) (0.843) 
airfare_index 0.004 0.013 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
hotelprice_index -0.002 -0.076 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.058) (0.007) 
Constant 1.873 -53.88 -11.49 
 (8.850) (28.39) (6.398) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 7 351 502 1 042 
R-squared 0.186 0.304 0.275 
Number of airports 74 5 10 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
  
 Emil Warras  
55 
 
Table 6 The effect of the aviation tax in Norway on international passenger numbers. 
Monthly and airport fixed effects for the time period 2011-2019. 
 
 (F1) (F2) (F3) 
 All airports Low-cost dominated Low-cost present 
    
norway*after -0.072 -2.590 -1.763 
 (0.165) (2.320) (1.638) 
aftertax2016 -0.053 0.654 0.101 
 (0.096) (0.388) (0.121) 
ln(p_total)it-12 1.145*** 1.544** 1.675*** 
 (0.143) (0.513) (0.549) 
ln(gdp_cap) -0.567 -0.562 -0.067 
 (0.661) (2.804) (1.065) 
airfare_index -0.001 0.007 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
hotelprice_index -0.000 -0.082 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.048) (0.008) 
Constant 0.898 7.771 -6.274 
 (7.330) (29.82) (8.387) 
    
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES 
Airport fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 10 620 674 1 370 
R-squared 0.163 0.259 0.219 
Number of airports 128 8 16 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
norway*after: DiD variable for an airport located in Sweden after the tax. aftertax2016: after June 2016. 
ln(p_total)it-12: a 12-month lag term. ln(gdp_cap): logarithmic GDP per capita. airfare_index: index for 
average airfare prices. hotelprice_index: index for average hotel prices. Includes fixed effects by month and 
airport. 
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Appendix II: Airport data 
Table 7 Airports serviced mainly by low-cost airlines. 
 
Lappeenranta  FIN 
Tampere FIN 
Stockholm Skavsta SWE 
Stockholm Västerås SWE 
Växsjö Småland SWE 
Haugesund NOR 
Sandefjord NOR 
Moss rygge NOR 
 
Table 8 Airports with a low-cost airline presence. 
 
 Helsinki airports FIN 
Lappeenranta  FIN 
Tampere FIN 
Göteborg Landvetter SWE 
Malmö airport SWE 
Stockholm Skavsta SWE 
Stockholm Västerås SWE 
Växsjö Småland SWE 
Haugesund NOR 
Oslo Gardermoen Airport NOR 
Sandefjord NOR 
Moss rygge NOR 
Aalborg DEN 
Aarhus DEN 
Billund DEN 
Copenhagen DEN 
